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ABSTRACT
Online professional social networks such as LinkedIn have
enhanced the ability of job seekers to discover and assess
career opportunities, and the ability of job providers to dis-
cover and assess potential candidates. For most job seekers,
salary (or broadly compensation) is a crucial consideration
in choosing a new job. At the same time, job seekers face
challenges in learning the compensation associated with dif-
ferent jobs, given the sensitive nature of compensation data
and the dearth of reliable sources containing compensation
data. Towards the goal of helping the world’s profession-
als optimize their earning potential through salary trans-
parency, we present LinkedIn Salary, a system for collecting
compensation information from LinkedIn members and pro-
viding compensation insights to job seekers. We present the
overall design and architecture, and describe the key com-
ponents needed for the secure collection, de-identification,
and processing of compensation data, focusing on the unique
challenges associated with privacy and security. We perform
an experimental study with more than one year of compen-
sation submission history data collected from over 1.5 mil-
lion LinkedIn members, thereby demonstrating the tradeoffs
between privacy and modeling needs. We also highlight the
lessons learned from the production deployment of this sys-
tem at LinkedIn.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online professional social networks such as LinkedIn have
enhanced the ability of job seekers to discover and assess
career opportunities, and the ability of job providers to dis-
cover and assess potential candidates. Compensation is known
to be a crucial consideration in choosing a new job op-
portunity for most job seekers.1 However, job seekers en-
counter obstacles in learning the compensation associated
with different jobs, given the sensitive nature of compen-
sation data and the dearth of reliable sources containing
compensation data. The recently launched LinkedIn Salary
1More candidates (74%) would like to see compensation
compared to any other feature in a job posting, according
to a survey of over 5000 job seekers in US and Canada [5].
Compensation is valued the most by job seekers when look-
ing for new opportunities, according to a US survey of 2305
adults [6].
.
product2 has been designed to help job seekers explore com-
pensation along different dimensions, make more informed
career decisions, and thereby optimize their earning poten-
tial through salary transparency.
With over 500 million members (registered users), to-
gether with the associated structured information including
the work experience, educational history, and skills, LinkedIn
is in a unique position to collect compensation data from its
members at scale and provide rich, robust insights covering
different aspects of compensation, while preserving member
privacy. For instance, we can provide insights on the dis-
tribution of base salary, bonus, equity, and other types of
compensation for a given profession; how they vary based
on factors such as region, experience, education, company
size, and industry; and which regions, industries, or compa-
nies pay the most.
Besides helping job seekers understand their economic value
in the marketplace, the compensation data has several other
social benefits. It can help us better understand the mone-
tary dimensions of the Economic Graph [44] (which includes
companies, industries, regions, jobs, skills, educational in-
stitutions, etc.). The availability of compensation insights
with respect to dimensions such as gender, ethnicity, and
other demographic factors can lead to greater transparency,
shedding light on the extent of compensation disparity, and
thereby help stakeholders including employers, employees,
and policy makers to take steps to address pay inequal-
ity. Further, products such as LinkedIn Salary can lead
to greater efficiency in the labor marketplace by reducing
asymmetry of compensation knowledge, and by serving as
market-perfecting tools for workers and employers [26]. Fi-
nally, such tools have the potential to help students make
good career choices, taking expected compensation into ac-
count, and to encourage workers to learn skills that are nec-
essary for obtaining well paying jobs, thereby helping narrow
the skills gap.
In this paper, we present LinkedIn Salary, a system for
securely collecting compensation information from LinkedIn
members and providing structured compensation insights to
job seekers. We highlight the unique challenges associated
with privacy and security while designing and implementing
the system, and present the overall design and architecture
that incorporates a combination of techniques such as en-
cryption, access control, de-identification, aggregation, and
thresholding. We also describe the key components needed
for the secure collection, de-identification, and processing of
2https://www.linkedin.com/salary
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compensation data. We empirically investigate the trade-
offs between privacy and modeling needs using more than
one year of compensation submission history data collected
from over 1.5 million LinkedIn members. We also highlight
the lessons learned in practice from the deployment of this
system at LinkedIn.
2. PROBLEM SETTING
We next give a brief overview of the product, followed by
a discussion of the key system design goals, as well the chal-
lenges from the privacy, security, and modeling perspectives.
We then present the problem statement.
In the publicly launched LinkedIn Salary product [37],
users can search for different titles and regions, and explore
the corresponding compensation insights (Figure 1). For a
given title and region, we present the quantiles (10th and
90th percentiles, median) and histograms for base salary,
bonus, and other types of compensation. We also present
more granular insights on how the pay varies based on fac-
tors such as region, experience, education, company size,
and industry, and which regions, industries, or companies
pay the most.
The compensation insights shown in the product are based
on more than one year of compensation data that we have
been collecting from LinkedIn members (Figure 2). We de-
signed the data collection process based on a give-to-get
model. First, we select cohorts (such as User Experience De-
signers in San Francisco Bay Area) with a sufficient number
of LinkedIn members. Within each cohort, we send emails
to a random subset of members, requesting them to submit
their compensation data (in return for aggregated compen-
sation insights later). Once we collect enough data, we get
back to the responding members with the compensation in-
sights, and also reach out to the remaining members in those
cohorts, promising corresponding insights immediately upon
submission of their compensation data. We describe the col-
lection mechanism in further detail in §3.3.1.
Figure 2 shows screenshots of the collection interface as
seen by a hypothetical user. The first two screens show
the interface for a member to enter the base salary and ad-
ditional compensation respectively for his/her current job
position. The current job position information is automat-
ically retrieved from the member’s profile and displayed on
the first screen, with an option for the member to modify
if desired. The member can choose to enter different types
of additional compensation, as shown in the second screen.
After the member submits the compensation data and once
the corresponding insights are available, the member is pre-
sented with these insights, along with other useful insights
such as the compensation for related positions in the same
region and the compensation for the same position in related
regions.
2.1 System Requirements and Challenges
Preserving privacy of members: Considering the sensitive
nature of compensation data and the desire for preserving
privacy of users, a key requirement is to design our system
such that there is protection against data breach, and any
one individual’s compensation data cannot be inferred by
observing the outputs of the system. We would like protec-
tion against external data breach as well as insider attacks.
Further, we require the compensation insights to be gener-
ated based on only cohort level data containing de-identified
compensation submissions (e.g., salaries for UX Designers in
San Francisco Bay Area), limited to those cohorts having at
least a minimum number of entries.
Engineering requirements: The system needs to be de-
signed such that “bootstrapping” can be performed when
needed. Bootstrapping refers to the ability to regenerate the
historical output data whenever there are changes in parts
of the system. For example, the need for this functionality
could arise due to software bugs in the system implementa-
tion, changes to the various services that are invoked by the
system, and changes to the product design such as addition
of new types of insights.
Modeling on aggregated data: Due to the privacy require-
ments stated above, the salary modeling system has access
only to cohort level data containing aggregated compensa-
tion submissions. Each cohort is defined by a combination
of attributes such as title, country, region, company, years of
experience, and so forth, and contains aggregated compen-
sation entries obtained from individuals having the same
values of those attributes. Within a cohort, each individ-
ual entry consists of values for different compensation types
such as base salary, annual bonus, sign-on bonus, commis-
sion, annual monetary value of vested stocks, and tips, and is
available without associated user name, id, or any attributes
other than those that define the cohort. As a result, our
modeling choices are limited since we have access only to
the aggregated data, and cannot, for instance, train predic-
tion models that make use of more discriminating features
not available due to de-identification.
Evaluation: We face unique evaluation and data quality
challenges that are typically not present in several other
user-facing products such as movie and job recommenda-
tions. Since users themselves may not have a good per-
ception of the true compensation range, we cannot perform
online A/B testing to compare the compensation insights
generated by different models. Further, there are very few
reliable and easily available ground truth datasets in the
compensation domain, and even when available (e.g., BLS
OES dataset [4]), mapping such datasets to LinkedIn’s tax-
onomy is inevitably noisy.
Outlier detection: The quality of the insights depends on
the quality of submitted data, and hence we need to detect
and prune potential outlier entries. Such entries could arise
due to either mistakes/misunderstandings during submis-
sion, or intentional falsification (such as someone attempt-
ing to game the system). We required a solution that would
work even during the early stages of data collection, when
this problem was more challenging, and there may not be
sufficient data across say, related cohorts.
Robustness and stability: Although some cohorts may each
have a large sample size, a large number of cohorts typically
contain very few (e.g., < 20) data points each. Given the
desire to have insights for as many cohorts as possible, we
need to make sure that the compensation insights are robust
and stable even when there is data sparsity. In other words,
the insights should be reliable, and not too sensitive to the
addition of a new entry for such cohorts. A related challenge
is whether we can reliably infer the insights for cohorts with
no data at all.
2.2 Problem Statement
Our focus in this paper is on the unique challenges asso-
ciated with privacy and security while designing and imple-
Figure 1: LinkedIn Salary Insights Page
Figure 2: LinkedIn Salary Collection Interface. The interfaces for a member to enter the base salary and
additional compensation for his/her job position are shown in the first two screens. The compensation insights
for the corresponding cohort are shown in the third screen.
menting the system. Our methodology for addressing the
modeling challenges is described in [29]. Our problem can
thus be stated as follows: How do we design LinkedIn Salary
system to meet the immediate and future needs of LinkedIn
Salary and other LinkedIn products? How do we design our
system taking into account the unique privacy and security
challenges, while addressing the product requirements? We
address these questions in §3, wherein we present the system
architecture that incorporates a combination of techniques
such as encryption, access control, de-identification, aggre-
gation, and thresholding.
3. LINKEDIN SALARY SYSTEM DESIGN
AND ARCHITECTURE
We describe the overall design and architecture of the
deployed system that powers the LinkedIn Salary product.
As part of the description, we present the security and de-
identification mechanisms. Our system uses a service ori-
ented architecture (see Figure 3), and consists of the follow-
ing three key components: a collection and storage compo-
nent, a de-identification and grouping component, and an
insights and modeling component. We provide an overview
of the requests and responses of the underlying services as-
sociated with a member submitting the compensation data
to see the insights. We refer to the step numbers found in
Figure 3 as part of this description.
3.1 Collection and Storage
The collection and storage component of our system is
responsible for allowing members to submit their compen-
sation information, collecting different member attributes,
and securely and privately storing the member attributes
as well as the submitted compensation data. The primary
entry point for the collection flow is through email cam-
paigns that target LinkedIn members, requesting them to
submit their compensation information (described in detail
in §3.3.1). Upon clicking on the email, the member is first
authenticated and then taken to the secure web interface
(that uses TLS) shown in Figure 2. Once the compensation
data is submitted by the member, this data passes through
multiple routing layers before reaching the front-end service.
All the intermediate layers also use TLS to secure the data
(Step 1 of the architecture diagram). The front-end ser-
vice is responsible for validation and authentication of the
request (Step 2). The data is then handed over to the sub-
mission service for storage. The submission service collects
member attributes such as title, company, and region, en-
crypts them along with compensation data and stores in a
persistent data store.
Collection APIs: LinkedIn exposes all of its services inter-
nally using RESTful APIs [23]. These services are powered
by rest.li, which is a open source REST + JSON framework
for building robust, scalable service architectures using type-
safe bindings, dynamic discovery, and simple asynchronous
APIs [2]. In particular, compensation collection APIs also
use the rest.li framework. The submission service is exposed
as a rest.li endpoint and the front-end service interacts with
the submission API over TLS (Step 3 in the diagram). The
submission service then extracts attributes from the mem-
ber profile using relevant data service APIs (Step 4). This
information is extracted during the time of submission since
the member may update the profile over time and we would
like to obtain the attribute values as of the time of the com-
pensation submission. Examples of the extracted member
attributes include the standardized (or canonical) versions
of job title, company, and region, obtained by invoking re-
spective LinkedIn standardization services. We also obtain
attributes such as the the currency exchange rate at the time
of submission.
Once we obtain the member attributes by invoking various
LinkedIn Data services, we perform 2048-bit RSA based en-
cryption of compensation data as well as member attributes,
and store in our data store using a write-only API (Step
5). We use different sets of public/private keys for en-
cryption/decryption of member attributes and compensa-
tion data due to reasons explained in §3.4.
Our system also provides a verification service which is
used to verify if a member has submitted compensation in-
formation in the past (not shown in Figure 3). This service
is powered by a different data store that only stores whether
(and when) a member submitted compensation information,
but not the compensation data itself. This store is needed
to power the give-to-get model used by our product.
3.2 De-identification and Grouping
Once the data is stored, we need to prepare it for anal-
ysis. We used an approach (inspired by k-Anonymity [36,
35, 41]) which allowed us to use existing LinkedIn infras-
tructure while preserving the privacy of LinkedIn members.
We construct collections of member-submitted compensa-
tion information by grouping together members satisfying
different predicates, and call these collections as “cohorts”
or “slices”. Each cohort or slice is defined by a combina-
tion of attributes such as canonical title, country, region,
company, and years of experience, and contains aggregated
compensation entries obtained from individuals having the
same values of those attributes. Within a cohort, each indi-
vidual entry contains values for different compensation types
such as base salary, annual bonus, sign-on bonus, commis-
sion, annual monetary value of vested stocks, and tips, and
is available without associated user name, id, or any at-
tributes other than those that define the cohort. An exam-
ple of a title-country-region slice would be “User Experience
Designers in San Francisco Bay Area”, and an example of
a title-company-country-region slice would be “User Experi-
ence Designers at Google in San Francisco Bay Area”. In ad-
dition to the de-identification, we also require that each co-
hort contain at least a minimum number k of entries, before
it is made available for offline data processing and analysis.
Note that prior to the above grouping, we apply LinkedIn
standardization software to map a free-form attribute to its
canonical version. For example, an arbitrary title is mapped
to one of about 25, 000 LinkedIn standardized (canonical) ti-
tles, and similarly, each company and each region also get
mapped to their canonical versions. This mapping is analo-
gous to the generalization step in k-Anonymity [36, 35, 41].
At first, we wanted to store and process the the encrypted
(but sensitive) data containing member attributes and mem-
ber compensation in LinkedIn’s Hadoop ecosystem. How-
ever, due to the inherent security limitations of Hadoop
and HDFS, we decided to limit the amount of data made
available in HDFS towards minimizing the chances of re-
identification, and pursued the de-identification approach of
slicing and requiring a minimum threshold of entries for pro-
cessing.
Figure 3: LinkedIn Salary System Architecture, consisting of components/services pertaining to collection &
storage, de-identification & grouping, and insights & modeling.
The slicing service runs asynchronously from the submis-
sion service, and is triggered for each new submission by a
member. Slicing service makes use of Databus, LinkedIn’s
open-source distributed change-data capture and notifica-
tion system [1] (Step 6 in Figure 3). We limit the data that
is stored at the Databus servers to only member attribute
information and submission identifiers (but not the com-
pensation data). This ensures that the compensation data
is secure even if the Databus service is breached. We use
stored attributes to generate the slices, which are then used
for analysis and generating insights.
As stated before, we perform analysis on a slice only af-
ter it contains a minimum number of submission entries.
Our system allows the specification of different minimum
thresholds for different slice types (e.g., title-country-region
vs title-company-country-region). The slicing service uses
a distributed data platform to keep track of the thresholds
(Step 7). The slicing service keeps track of the number of
submissions that have been collected so far for each slice,
and will decide to make a slice available for processing by
subsequent components only once the number of submis-
sions exceeds the minimum threshold. In particular, since
the slicing service does not access the compensation data
at all, a slice that has not met the threshold will not have
the associated compensation entries. Thus, for example, the
slice, “User Experience Designers at Google in San Francisco
Bay Area” would get processed once the threshold is met,
while the slice, “CEOs at LinkedIn in San Francisco Bay
Area” would never get processed and hence the associated
compensation will not be available downstream.
Our system supports a mechanism for modifying the times-
tamp associated with the compensation submission so as to
prevent timestamp based inference attacks, that is, prevent
the ability to obtain the member’s identity by joining with
page view or other logs (discussed in detail in §3.4.1). The
modification can be either in the form of a random delay, or
based on the other submissions in the cohort. Such modifi-
cation of the timestamp is performed using the delayed job
queue (Step 8).
Once the queue task is ready to be processed, it is picked
up by the preparation service (Step 9). As our gateway
service to the offline system, the preparation service pre-
pares the data by fetching the compensation data stored
during collection (Step 10), and associates it with the slice
data. The compensation data corresponding to the sub-
mission identifiers in a slice is fetched and decrypted, and
afterwards, the submission identifiers are removed from the
slice. In this manner, we do not retain any association be-
tween the (decrypted) compensation data in a slice and the
corresponding submission identifiers. The prepared data is
then copied to HDFS for offline processing (Step 11). At this
stage, our system supports the ability to perform rounding
or generalization of compensation entry values with a goal
of minimizing the risk of joining the de-identified data with
itself based on the exact compensation value and thereby
identifying multiple attributes associated with each com-
pensation entry. We remark that the use of two different
services, slicing service and preparation service, instead of a
combined single service, provides an extra layer of security.
This gives us protection against linking together member at-
tribute data and compensation data if any one service gets
breached.
3.3 Compensation Insights and Modeling
3.3.1 Selection and Targeting of Members
We next describe the data collection process, focusing on
the selection of cohorts and members for sending emails re-
questing submission of compensation data. First, cohorts
with a sufficient number of LinkedIn members were selected.
The members within a cohort were randomly ordered, and
emails were sent to a random subset of members (following
this order), requesting them to submit their compensation
data (in return for aggregated compensation insights later).
Once we collected suffficient data, we got back to the re-
sponding members with the compensation insights, and also
reached out to the remaining members in the cohort, promis-
ing insights immediately upon submission of their compen-
sation data. We partitioned a cohort in this manner since
providing compensation insights immediately upon submis-
sion results in a higher response rate, as well as a better
user experience, and hence we wanted to ensure that as few
members as possible were requested prior to the availability
of compensation insights.
We dynamically adapted the above process based on the
observed response rate. For example, by sending emails to
the first r1 members in the random ordering and observing
the number of responses s1, we estimated the response rate,
γ as s1/r1. If the desired number of responses is α, we then
reached out to about r2 = α/γ − r1 additional members.
Further, we wanted to target a cohort only if we expected
enough responses to be able to get back with the compen-
sation insights. For this purpose, we estimated the response
rate for a cohort based on other similar cohorts (e.g., con-
sidering the response rates for the same title in other regions
in the case of a title-country-region cohort).
We remark that through random sampling (which is a
special case of probability-based sampling [25]) and targeted
data collection, we minimize any selection bias and ensure
that the chosen set of members is representative of the un-
derlying population of LinkedIn members in the cohort. In
contrast, compensation insights obtained based on self-reported
surveys need not be representative of the underlying popu-
lation. Addressing other types of biases (such as response
bias) is an avenue for future work.
3.3.2 Computation and Presentation of Compensa-
tion Insights
Whenever compensation insights are requested (say, right
after the member entering compensation data, or as part of
LinkedIn Salary product), the front-end service queries the
verification service via a REST API to determine whether
the member is eligible to view the insights. Based on the
product and business needs, the eligibility can be defined in
terms of criteria such as whether the member has provided
his/her compensation data within the last one year (give-to-
get model), whether the member has purchased a LinkedIn
premium membership, whether the member satisfies a pred-
icate expressed in terms of demographic / profile-based at-
tributes (e.g., a middle-skilled worker; a student; based in
emerging markets), or whether the member satisfies a pred-
icate expressed in terms of activity attributes (e.g., likely
to transition from being an active member to an inactive
member). If yes, the front-end obtains the compensation
insights by querying the salary insight service. For each co-
hort, depending on data availability, the compensation in-
sight could include the quantiles (10th and 90the percentiles,
median), and histograms for base salary and other compen-
sation types. In addition, there are also other insights such
as how the pay varies based on factors such as region, in-
dustry, experience, education, and company size [29].
The insights are generated using an offline data process-
ing workflow that consumes the de-identified compensation
dataset (Step 12 in Figure 3) and populates the insight
Voldemort data stores [39] (Step 13), which are then used
by the salary insight service (Step 14). Statistical modeling
components such as outlier detection and Bayesian hierar-
chical smoothing are used in the offline workflow to compute
robust compensation insights. See [29] for an in-depth de-
scription of the salary insight service, the offline workflow,
and the statistical modeling components.
We remark that in addition to helping compute robust
compensation insights for cohorts with very little data, Bayesian
smoothing methodology also helps to achieve privacy in cer-
tain cases. It is possible for the salaries to be identical in a
cohort with very few entries, thereby defeating the benefit
of having a minimum threshold after de-identification. For
example, the cohort “User Experience Designers at Google
in San Francisco Bay Area” may contain submissions from
just 6 members, each with 110K as the base salary. In such
cases, the smoothing helps to derive a more reliable cohort
estimate by “borrowing strength” from the ancestral cohorts
that have sufficient data, and thereby not reveal the empir-
ical percentiles (all of which equal 110K) [29]. Further, the
smoothing helps to minimize the privacy risk by not reveal-
ing the empirical percentiles based on very few data points,
which could be quite sensitive to the addition of new data
points.
3.4 Security Mechanisms
We next describe the security mechanisms in our archi-
tecture.
Encryption (and decryption) of member attributes and com-
pensation data using different sets of public (and private)
key pairs: Recall that the data collected by the submission
service corresponding to each member submission consists
of two components: the member attributes and the com-
pensation data. Since the combination of different member
attributes could uniquely identify an individual in certain
cases [40] (e.g., the attributes, title: “CEO” and company:
“LinkedIn” together correspond to one person at a given
point of time), we would like to not only store the member
attributes and the compensation data in encrypted form, but
also use different encryption keys for both. As a result, an
attacker that has access to only one of the decryption keys
cannot infer the association between the member attributes
and the corresponding compensation data. Further, our sys-
tem is designed in such a way that no service has a need to
simultaneously decrypt both the member attributes and the
compensation data, and hence is not given access to both
decryption keys as elaborated below. By using asymmetric,
public key cryptography, we also ensure that the submission
service can perform encryption but not decryption. In the
very unlikely event of the submission service being breached,
the attacker would still not be able to decrypt the histori-
cal submissions (since it does not have the private keys),
let alone retrieve the historical data (since the access to the
store is using a write-only API).
Separation of processing of member attributes and compen-
sation data: In our system, the member attributes and the
compensation data are never processed at the same time,
or by the same service, after the initial submission. This
design, together with the use of two different encryption
mechanisms, ensures that an attacker would have to break
into both encryption systems (and hence multiple services)
to be able to connect the dots between member attributes
and their corresponding compensation data.
Key store security: We achieved key store security by sepa-
rating the keys into multiple keystores. Although the key-
stores are password protected, we decided to restrict access
to the key resource(s) among different services, and hence
separated the keys into multiple keystores.
Limiting access to keys: Each service only has access to the
public key(s) needed for encryption, and the private key(s)
needed for decryption. We next describe the encryption and
decryption of data through the system workflow to illustrate
this design choice. Upon obtaining the member attributes
and the compensation data, the submission service encrypts
them using the respective public keys, Mpub and Cpub, and
then stores in the submission data store. Since this service
would never be required to decrypt these data, it does not
have access to the corresponding private keys. Then, the
slicing service which listens to the Databus stream gets trig-
gered. Since this service requires member attribute informa-
tion to create the slices, it decrypts the member attributes
using the corresponding private key, Mpri. Since the slicing
service does not need to access the compensation data at
all, it does not possess the corresponding private key, Cpri.
Next, the distributed threshold data store is used to identify
whether a slice has met its threshold requirement. The data
in this store is encrypted using the symmetric key, T sym
instead of using asymmetric, public/private keys since this
data is always encrypted and decrypted by the same service
(slicing service). Once the threshold for a certain slice has
been met, the data is decrypted and pushed into the delayed
job queue along with the corresponding slice information.
When the preparation service consumes the data from the
queue, it fetches the compensation data corresponding to
the submission identifiers in each slice from the submission
data store and decrypts it using the corresponding private
key, Cpri, prior to copying the data to HDFS. Note that this
service does not need to access the member attributes, and
hence does not possess the corresponding private key, Mpri.
Key rotation: Our design supports a key rotation mecha-
nism to rotate expired or compromised keys and re-encrypt
the data if needed, and to perform periodic re-encryption
if needed. This process will be carried out from the ser-
vice that has access to the private key, e.g., the slicing ser-
vice would rotate keys for the member attributes, while the
preparation service would rotate keys for the compensation
data.
No single point of failure: By appropriate separation of ser-
vices and using different sets of encryption/decryption keys
for different data components, our design ensures that there
is no single point of failure. Member privacy would be pre-
served if there is any single point of breach to the services or
the data stores, for example, if any one system (e.g., HDFS,
submission data store, threshold data store, slicing service,
preparation service) were to be breached.
Infrastructure security: In addition to measures for member
data privacy, we also focus on the security of the under-
lying communication and storage infrastructure. The web
interfaces associated with compensation collection and in-
sights serve traffic over HTTPS. We also encrypt the com-
munication between LinkedIn’s web servers and datacenters
(through intermediate layers) using TLS. We also secure the
data storage layers using a combination of encryption (ex-
plained above) and authentication (e.g., only allow connec-
tions to the data store from trusted services running on (pre-
configured) trusted hosts).
3.4.1 Preventing Timestamp Based Inference Attacks
We next describe the mechanisms supported by our sys-
tem for preventing timestamp based inference attacks. These
attacks rely on the ability to join the de-identified compen-
sation data with data containing member identity, on the
timestamp information. For example, page view and other
event logs could contain information on when a member ac-
cessed the page associated with the compensation collection
web interface. Hence, it is not desirable for the exact times-
tamp to be retained with a submitted compensation entry in
the de-identified data. One possible mechanism is to perturb
the timestamp by adding a random time period drawn from
a certain distribution. For example, we could add a ran-
dom delay up to say, 48 hours to the true timestamp, and
make the data available for processing only after this delay.
While simple and elegant to implement, this approach may
not provide sufficient protection when the submissions ar-
rive infrequently in a cohort, for example, once every week.
Hence, our design also supports another mechanism based on
k-Anonymity wherein the modification to the timestamp is a
function of other submissions in a cohort. The key idea is to
define a hierarchy of timestamps (e.g., second → minute →
hour → date → week → . . .), and generalize the timestamp
for each compensation entry in a cohort to the granularity at
which there are at least (k − 1) other entries with the same
timestamp value. However, since our approach needs to be
incremental in practice, we can achieve this property by pro-
cessing entries within a cohort in batches of size k, generaliz-
ing to a common timestamp within each batch, and making
additional data available for offline processing only in such
incremental batches. Processing in batches could also be
used to achieve incremental privacy protection, since the in-
sight for a cohort would not be sensitive to a single new
submission but only batches of k or more submissions.
3.4.2 Protecting Against Over-representation
The quality of the compensation insights depends cru-
cially on ensuring that the submissions are representative
of the underlying cohort. Although we reach out to ran-
domly sampled members from each cohort as discussed in
§3.3.1, we need to also ensure that a member cannot submit
the compensation data multiple times, or too often to avoid
over-representation of certain members. For this reason and
Figure 4: The distribution of compensation submis-
sions as a function of time lapsed since the email
request
also for enabling the give-to-get model, we maintain a data
store containing when a member submitted compensation
information, and query this store to constrain how often
a member can re-submit the compensation data. We can
achieve this goal in different ways: (1) by limiting the fre-
quency (e.g., at most once every 12 months), (2) by limiting
the frequency, customized for different industries/functions
by taking into account how often pay changes, how often
people change jobs, etc, or (3) based on a change in a mem-
ber’s profile (e.g., whenever the member adds a new job
position, or updates the job description).
4. EXPERIMENTS
We next present an experimental study of the LinkedIn
Salary system, focusing on the the tradeoffs between privacy
and modeling requirements.
4.1 Experimental Setup
As stated earlier, our system has been deployed in pro-
duction at LinkedIn, initially for collection of compensation
data from LinkedIn members and later for powering the pub-
licly launched LinkedIn Salary product. We study the dis-
tribution of responses over time and investigate the tradeoffs
between privacy guarantees and data available for comput-
ing compensation insights. Our experiments are performed
using more than one year of compensation submission his-
tory data collected from over 1.5 million LinkedIn members,
across three countries (USA, Canada, and UK). Note that
we use just the submission history data, and not the com-
pensation data itself for these experiments. Since LinkedIn
Salary uses a give-to-get model, we need to keep track of the
submission history for each member (as discussed in §3.1).
An extensive study and evaluation of the compensation in-
sights and the associated statistical modeling components is
presented in [29].
4.2 Studying the Distribution of Compensa-
tion Submissions
We first study how soon members respond upon receiv-
ing the emails requesting them to provide the compensation
Figure 5: Relative percent of cohorts that are avail-
able vs. the minimum threshold
information. Figure 4 shows the cumulative percentage of
responses received as a function of the time lapsed. In this
figure, the X-axis denotes the number of days that have
lapsed since the email request. For each possible value d
of the number of days lapsed, we compute the correspond-
ing number of member submission responses, and thereby
obtain the cumulative percentage of responses that were re-
ceived within d days of email request, plotted in Y-axis. We
observe that 80% of responses were received within one day
of email request, suggesting that batching together responses
to achieve greater privacy is not likely to lead to significant
delay or withholding of data for modeling purposes. Further,
more than 85% of all responses were received within first 5
days of email request. The responses took considerable time
in certain cases: about 5% of responses were received after
135 days!
4.3 Studying the Tradeoffs between Privacy
and Modeling Needs
As discussed in §3.2, a cohort needs to contain a mini-
mum number k of entries before the cohort and the asso-
ciated compensation data is made available for offline data
processing. By varying k, we obtain a tradeoff between the
level of privacy protection and the amount of data available
for modeling. Figure 5 presents the relative percent of title-
country-region cohorts that are available as a function of the
minimum threshold, k. Note that we only used cohorts with
at least 3 entries for this analysis. We observe that only
about 65% of the cohorts will be available with a threshold
of 5 and 38% of the cohorts with a threshold of 10, com-
pared to a threshold of 3. In other words, out of the cohorts
with at least 3 entries, about one-third have either 3 or 4
entries each; slightly less than one-third have between 5 and
9 entries each; and the rest have 10 or more entries each.
Next, we studied the effect of processing entries within a
cohort in batches of size k (in addition to requiring a mini-
mum threshold of k), and generalizing to a common times-
tamp within each batch. As discussed in §3.4.1, processing
in batches helps to protect against timestamp based infer-
ence attacks and to also achieve incremental privacy protec-
tion. However, this results in some data being delayed or
Figure 6: Percent of data available vs. the batch
size
unavailable for offline processing. For example, if there are
currently 8 submissions in a cohort and the batch size is 5,
then the 6th, 7th, and 8th entries would not be made avail-
able. Figure 6 shows the percent of data that is available
as a function of the batch size, k. For each k, we compute
the number of entries available due to processing in batches
(aggregated across cohorts) divided by the total number of
entries (aggregated across cohorts). Again, we only consid-
ered title-country-region cohorts that have at least 3 sub-
missions. We see that about 4.5% of the submissions would
be withheld with a batch size of k = 3 (compared to none in
the absence of batching, since we only consider cohorts with
at least 3 entries), about 13% of the submissions would be
withheld with a batch size of k = 5, and about 24% of the
submissions would be withheld with a batch size of k = 10.
We also investigated the actual delays that could emerge
as a result of processing data in batches. Our results are
presented in Figures 7–11. We calculated these delays as
follows. For each title-country-region cohort, we first com-
pute the delays introduced for certain submissions as a result
of processing in batches, limiting to those submissions that
would get processed. For example, if a cohort has 8 entries
submitted on days 1, 2, . . . , 8 respectively, and the batch size
is 5, then we would ignore the last three entries, and asso-
ciate a delay of 4 days, 3 days, 2 days, 1 day, and 0 day
respectively for the first five entries. We then sort the delay
values within each cohort, and compute different percentiles
(for instance, the median delay (50th percentile) would be
2 days in the above example). For each batch size and each
percentage, we aggregate the corresponding delay percentile
values across all cohorts, and show the distribution using
a box-and-whisker plot. The median across all cohorts is
shown as a red horizontal line, with the box boundaries cor-
responding to q1 (25th percentile) and q3 (75th percentile)
respectively. The ends of the whiskers correspond to the
lower limit, computed as max(0, q1 − 1.5(q3 − q1)) and the
upper limit, computed as q3 + 1.5(q3− q1) respectively. The
points outside this range are plotted as outliers (each with a
red plus sign). For example, we can infer from Figure 8 that,
for a batch size of 8, the 30th percentile delay values range
from 0 to 24 days for three-fourth of the cohorts, with a me-
Figure 7: 10th percentile of the delays introduced
by batching
Figure 8: 30th percentile of the delays introduced
by batching
dian of 4 days. Similarly, Figure 9 shows that the median
delay for three-fourth of the cohorts is less than about five
weeks for batch sizes up to 10, although the median delay
could be as high as 300 to 400 days for a few outlier cohorts
that receive relatively fewer and infrequent submissions.
5. LESSONS LEARNED IN PRACTICE
Our architecture and design choices evolved over the course
of the project, by taking into account various practical con-
siderations. The product design and user interface has been
evolving over time based on feedback from end users as well
as focus group studies, and consequently, our architecture
had to be designed to enable rapid iterations, for example,
through easy creation and modification of cohort types, and
flexible design of key-value stores. From time to time, we
also performed “bootstrapping” to regenerate the historical
output data due to changes in some system components, e.g.,
due to software bugs in the system implementation, changes
to the various services that are invoked by the system, and
Figure 9: 50th percentile of the delays introduced
by batching
Figure 10: 70th percentile of the delays introduced
by batching
Figure 11: 90th percentile of the delays introduced
by batching
changes to the product design such as addition of new types
of insights. Our privacy model choices were also influenced
by the unique product needs as well as limitations of our
setting, as discussed in §6. As discussed in §3.2, we first
considered storing and processing the encrypted (but sensi-
tive) data in LinkedIn’s Hadoop ecosystem, but chose the
de-identification approach instead due to the security lim-
itations of Hadoop and HDFS. During deployment of our
system, we realized that it is not only necessary to have sep-
arate services for the encryption of member attributes and
the compensation data, but also that these services need to
be deployed on different machines. Otherwise, an attacker
could get access to a single machine containing both services,
thereby being able to decrypt both the member attribute
data and the compensation data, which defeats our goals.
We used custom deployment tools to ensure that these ser-
vices are deployed in different machines.
6. RELATED WORK
Salary Information Products: There are several commer-
cial services offering information pertaining to compensation
and benefits. For example, Glassdoor [7] offers a compara-
ble service, while PayScale [9] collects individual salary sub-
missions, offers free reports for detailed matches, and sells
compensation information to companies. The US Bureau of
Labor Statistics [8] publishes a variety of statistics on pay
and benefits.
Privacy: Preserving user privacy is important when col-
lecting compensation data, considering its sensitive nature.
There is rich literature in the field of privacy-preserving data
mining spanning different research communities (e.g., [35,
41, 10, 12, 22, 28, 42, 30, 11, 32, 31]), as well as on the limita-
tions of simple anonymization techniques (e.g., [13, 33, 38]).
Based on the lessons learned from the privacy literature, we
first attempted to make use of rigorous privacy techniques
such as differential privacy [18, 19] in our problem setting.
However, we soon realized that these are not applicable in
our context for the following reasons: (1) the amount of noise
to be added to the quantiles, histograms, and other insights
would be very large (thereby depriving the compensation in-
sights of their reliability and usefulness), since the worst case
sensitivity of these functions to any one user’s compensation
data could be large, and (2) the insights need to be provided
on a continual basis with the arrival of new data points. Al-
though there is theoretical work on applying differential pri-
vacy under continual observations [16, 20], we have not come
across any practical implementations or applications of these
techniques. We also explored approaches similar to recent
work at Google [21] and Apple [24] on privacy-preserving
data collection at scale that focuses on applications such as
learning statistics about how unwanted software is hijacking
users’ settings in Chrome browser and discovering the us-
age patterns of a large number of iOS users for improving
the touch keyboard respectively. These approaches are (or
seem to be) built on the concept of randomized response [43]
and require response from typically hundreds of thousands of
users for the results to be useful. In contrast, even the larger
of our cohorts contain only a few thousand data points, and
hence these approaches are not applicable in our setting.
Survey Techniques: There is extensive work on traditional
statistical survey techniques [25, 27], as well on newer areas
such as web survey methodology [15]. See [3] for a survey
of non-response bias challenges, and [14] for an overview of
selection bias.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We presented the design and architecture of LinkedIn Salary,
a system for securely collecting compensation information
from LinkedIn members and providing structured compen-
sation insights to job seekers. We highlighted unique chal-
lenges associated with privacy and security, and described
how we addressed them using techniques such as encryption,
access control, de-identification, aggregation, and threshold-
ing. We demonstrated the tradeoffs between privacy and
modeling needs through an experimental study with more
than one year of compensation submission history data col-
lected from over 1.5 million LinkedIn members. We also
discussed the design decisions and tradeoffs while building
our system, and the lessons learned from the production de-
ployment of this system at LinkedIn.
An interesting direction to extend this work is to investi-
gate approaches for improving the balance between privacy
and modeling needs. For instance, we could explore the ap-
plicability of provably privacy-preserving machine learning
approaches (e.g., [17, 34]) in our setting. Such explorations
would require a redesign of the system, wherein we perform
modeling on a secure cluster of servers with access to produc-
tion databases and build richer prediction models that make
use of more discriminating features beyond those available
post de-identification. We would also like to incorporate out-
lier detection during submission stage by using user profile
and behavioral features. Further research directions for im-
proving the modeling components and for studying compen-
sation data towards improving the efficiency of career mar-
ketplace are discussed in [29]. More broadly, by presenting
the practical challenges encountered and the lessons learned
during the design and deployment of privacy mechanisms for
an emerging internet application, we hope to stimulate new
research directions in privacy-aware computing.
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